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Abstract
Background: The ability to travel mentally through time sets humans apart from many other species, yet little is known
about this core cognitive capacity. In particular, what shapes the passage of the mind’s journey through time? Guided by
the viewpoint that higher cognitive activity can have a sensory-motor grounding, we explored the possibility that mental
time travel is influenced by apparent movement through space.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Participants performed a mundane vigilance task, during which they were expected to
daydream, while viewing a display that elicited an illusion of self-motion (i.e., vection). Afterwards, the contents of their
mind wandering experiences were probed. The results revealed that the direction of apparent motion influenced the
temporal focus of mental time travel. While backward vection prompted thinking about the past, forward vection triggered
a preponderance of future-oriented thoughts.
Conclusions/Significance: Consistent with recent evidence that traveling mentally through time entails associated
movements in space, the current results demonstrate the converse relationship—apparent movement through space
influenced the temporal locus of mental activity. Together, these findings corroborate the viewpoint that mental time travel
may be grounded in the embodiment of spatiotemporal information in a bidirectional manner.
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Introduction
A core facet of conscious experience is that one’s mind
periodically wanders from the here-and-now. From memories of
lost loves to expectations about forthcoming vacations, mental
time travel (MTT) makes it possible to revisit the past and pre-
experience the future [1–5]. Present across cultures and emerging
early in childhood [6–8], MTT is believed to serve a pivotal
function in human cognition. Indeed, it has been suggested that
the emergence of this ability was a critical milestone in hominid
evolution [9]. When confronted with complex and challenging
judgments (e.g., should I buy stocks or deposit my savings in the
bank?), simulating future outcomes (i.e., prospection) on the basis of
prior experience (i.e., retrospection) is a tactic that optimizes decision-
making and behavioral selection [10–12]. That the past informs
the future in this way (i.e., recollection-guides-simulation) is evidenced
from research demonstrating that retrospection and prospection
rely on largely overlapping neural structures and cognitive
operations [3,13,14].
In addition to elucidating the neuro-anatomy of MTT [3,14–
17], recent work has also documented how this capacity is
influenced by aging, mental illness and injury to the brain
[15,18,19]. These important advances aside, however, remarkably
little is known about the actual process of MTT and how it
impacts people’s behavior. In this respect, one emerging possibility
is that MTT may be represented in the sensory-motor systems that
regulate human movement (i.e., MTT is embodied) [20–22].
Characterizing the covert process of psychological time travel in
this way yields some interesting behavioral predictions. Specifi-
cally, if: (i) the metaphorical arrow of time (i.e., past = backward,
future = forward) [23–25] is grounded in a perception-action
system that integrates temporal with spatial information and; (ii)
embodied constructs can be revealed motorically [21], then one
would expect episodes of MTT to be accompanied by distinct
patterns of movement (i.e., retrospection = backward movement,
prospection = forward movement). Put simply, traveling mentally
in time may initiate associated bodily movements through space.
Initial evidence for such a thought-action coupling during MTT
was reported in a study in which spontaneous fluctuations in the
direction and magnitude of postural sway were assessed while
participants engaged in either retrospective or prospective mental
imagery [26]. The results revealed that the temporal locus of MTT
did indeed influence the direction of people’s movements —
whereas retrospection was accompanied by significant backwards
sway, prospection yielded postural movement in an anterior
direction. Noteworthy though these findings may be, they raise
important questions regarding the precise theoretical status of the
sensory-motor grounding of MTT [21,22]. In particular, it is
unclear what role movement may play in effecting the higher-
order cognitive activity that supports MTT. Extant accounts of
embodied phenomena point to the possibility of a bi-directional
relationship between mind and body [27–29], such that just as
mental events influence bodily states, so too bodily states impact
mental events. Reflecting the hypothesized grounding of MTT in
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latter class of effect to emerge during episodes of mind wandering.
Specifically, information about one’s direction of movement (i.e.,
backward or forward) should influence the mind’s preferred
temporal destination during day dreaming (i.e., past or future).
Noting that minds typically wander during tedious, easy or
practiced activities [30], in the current investigation participants
were required to perform a vigilance task in which to-be-detected
targets appeared infrequently. Under such conditions (i.e., a
cognitively undemanding task), spontaneous mental time travel
was expected to occur [17]. To explore the effects of the direction
of movement on the temporal locus of MTT, target items in the
vigilance task were embedded in a dynamic visual display that
conveyed vection – the illusion of self-motion [31,32]. Vection is a
common experience in daily life. Consider, for example, sitting on
a stationary train and observing a carriage on an adjacent track
begin to move. This situation can trigger a compelling impression
that it is oneself, rather than the nearby train that is moving. Of
relevance to the current inquiry, comparable sensations of self-
motion can be elicited by visual displays depicting simple patterns
of optical flow [33,34]. To this end, we employed a basic star-field
animation similar to that found as a screen-saver option on many
personal computers. In this animation stars appeared to move
either towards (i.e., centripetal inflow) or away from (i.e.,
centrifugal outflow) the center of the display thus inducing
backward or forward linear vection, respectively [34]. Employed
in this way, optical flow serves as an ideal vehicle to explore the
effects of apparent self-motion in laboratory settings [35].
To summarize, participants performed a mundane vigilance
task while viewing animations that specified either backward or
forward vection. Afterwards, the contents of their mind wandering
experiences were probed. We anticipated that the direction of
optical flow would modulate the mind’s preferred temporal
destination during MTT. Specifically, whereas backward vection
was expected to trigger participants to dwell on the past, forward
vection was expected to precipitate predominantly future-oriented
thoughts.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was reviewed and approved by the School of
Psychology, University of Aberdeen Ethics Committee. All
participants gave written informed consent prior to taking part.
Participants and Design
Twenty-six undergraduates (aged 17–52 years; 22 females) took
part in return for course credit. The experiment had a single-factor
(vection: backward vs. forward) between-participants design.
Stimuli
An animated star-field display comprising approximately 1000
randomly positioned white dots on a black background was
constructed (see Figure 1, top panels). The dots (i.e., stars) were
animated (25 fps) so as to appear to move, on a linear trajectory,
either toward (i.e., centripetally) or away from (i.e., centrifugally)
the center of the display, corresponding to the experience of
backward and forward vection, respectively [34]. As a manipu-
lation check, an additional 19 participants were shown a 60 s
display of either the centripetal (n=10) or centrifugal (n=9) star-
field and asked to report the direction of any movement they
experienced. As expected, participants who viewed the centripetal
flow reported backward movement, while those who viewed
centrifugal flow reported forward movement.
Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually to take part in
a study concerning vigilance in dynamic environments. The
experimenter explained that they would be required to monitor a
moving display for designated targets. Specifically, participants
were instructed to click a mouse button as quickly as possible
whenever they detected a target (O) but to withhold clicking when
a distracter (X) appeared. Targets and distracters were super-
imposed at the center of the star-field display at 3 s intervals and
remained on screen for 500 ms. Importantly, targets were rare –
over the course of the 6 minute vigilance task, 114 distracters but
only 6 targets were presented (targets appeared at 21 s, 63 s, 162 s,
216 s, 294 s, and 333 s) thereby creating a somewhat dull task
context in which day dreaming was expected to occur [30]. The
display was projected onto a large screen (image size: 145 cm wide
x 110 cm high) and participants were seated approximately
200 cm from the screen such that the center of the star-field was at
approximately eye-level.
Immediately after completing the vigilance task, participants were
asked if they had, at any stage during the procedure, experienced
task-unrelated thoughts (i.e., day dreams). One participant (back-
wards vection condition) reported no off-task thinking and was
therefore asked no further questions. The remaining participants
(n=25) were asked to estimate what proportion of their day dreams
wererelatedtopastcomparedtofutureevents.Specifically,theywere
instructed to discount any task-unrelated thoughts that were
temporally located in the present and to consider only their day
dreams that related to the past or the future. Participants indicated
their response on an analogue scale consisting of a 150 mm
horizontal line anchored by ‘‘Past Events’’ on the left and ‘‘Future
Events’’ on the right. It was explained that if, for example, they had
onlyexperiencedpast(orfuture)relateddaydreamstheyshouldplace
a mark at the left (or right) extreme end of the scale, but if their off-
task thoughts comprised both past and future events their mark
should reflect the relative proportion of one to the other. Using the
sameresponseformat,participantswerealsoaskedtoratethevalence
of their day dreams (anchored by ‘‘negative’’ and ‘‘positive’’) and to
report the total proportion of the time during the vigilance task they
spent day dreaming (anchored by ‘‘off task’’ and ‘‘on task’’). After
completing their ratings, participants were funnel debriefed with
respect to any suspicions they had regarding the purpose of the study.
No participants reported any knowledge of the hypothesized link
between the direction of optical flow (i.e., the direction of the star-field
animation) and the temporal locus of their day dreams. Finally,
participants were fully debriefed and dismissed.
Results
The proportion of participants’ day dreams relating to past
compared to future events was calculated by dividing each
response (measured in mm; potential range from 0 to 150) by 150
(the maximum value on the scale). The resulting scores therefore
represented the proportion of task-unrelated thoughts about the
future. An independent t-test revealed that participants in the
forward vection condition reported a significantly higher propor-
tion of future-related day dreams compared to their counterparts
in the backward vection condition [t(23)=2.38, p,.05, d=0.94;
see Figure 1, bottom panels]. No differences were observed as a
function of vection condition with respect to either the valence of
day dreams [t(23)=0.71, p=.49; Mbackward=64.4%, Mforward=
58.4%] or the total proportion of time spent day dreaming
during the vigilance task [t(23)=0.68, p=.50; Mbackward=45.4%,
Mforward=39.8%].
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The current findings reveal that the direction of vection (i.e.,
illusory self-motion) modulates the temporal locus of MTT. This
spatial mapping of retrospection and prospection extends a rapidly
emerging literature exploring both the neural correlates and
representational structures involved in processing temporally-
bound information [3,13–17,23–25,36]. Moreover, just as it has
recently been established that traveling mentally through time is
associated with physical movements through space (i.e., past
thoughts = backward movement, future thoughts = forward
movement) [26], the current experiment demonstrated the reverse
relationship – apparent movement through space influenced the
temporal focus of mental activity (i.e., backward vection = past
thoughts, forward vection = future thoughts). Together, these
studies suggest that the core cognitive capacity of MTT may be
grounded in the embodiment of spatiotemporal information in a
bidirectional manner [20–22,26–28].
While the present research adopts an embodied approach to
cognition [20–22,27,28], it should be noted that more traditional
information processing accounts could also be applicable. While
suggestive, the current study does not provide direct evidence for
the representational mechanisms that underlie the integration of
time and space during episodes of MTT. That is, while theories of
embodiment point to modality-specific representations of, in this
case, spatiotemporal information [20–22], it is conceivable that
such information may be stored in an amodal format (e.g.,
semantic networks, schemata, feature lists) [37,38]. Similarly, it is
possible that the current effects could potentially have been
mediated by language to the extent that participants consciously
recognized the direction of apparent motion specified by the
vection display (e.g., ‘‘I feel like I’m moving backwards’’), which in
turn may have influenced the temporal location of their
daydreams. In short, while the effects reported here are entirely
consistent with a growing body of evidence demonstrating that
abstract metaphorical concepts can be borne out in more concrete
domains via embodied processes [20–22,27–29,39,40], alternative
explanations regarding the representational status of spatiotem-
poral information cannot, at this stage, be discounted.
The present results also draw attention to another pertinent
theoretical issue – what are the foundations of the spatiotem-
poral coupling evident during MTT? One possibility lies in the
experiential basis of people’s interactions with the environment
[41,42]. By virtue of a morphology geared primarily for
forward-oriented action (e.g., looking, locomoting), humans
typically encounter a world that unfolds in front of them.
People regulate their behavior in order that things which have
yet to occur (i.e., future events) are located to the fore, whereas
that which has already been (i.e., past events) is consigned to
positions behind the body. This particular mapping of time
and space is widely reflected in metaphoric language (e.g.,
looking forward to tomorrow, thinking back on yesterday),
cognition [23–25,36] and, as reported here, sensory-motor
processing [26].
Figure 1. Vection and mental time travel. Illustrations of the direction of optical flow specified by the star-field displays (top panels) and the
relative proportion of past and future day dreams reported by participants (bottom panels) as a function of vection condition (i.e., backward or
forward).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010825.g001
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concrete spatial information may also have more sociocultural
origins. To illustrate, speakers of Aymara, an Amerindian
language of the Andes, employ the reverse spatiotemporal
mapping (i.e., past = in front, future = behind), during both
verbal and non-verbal (i.e., gesture) communication [43]. This
pattern is purportedly derived from sociolinguistic convention
whereby that which is known (e.g., the past) is located to the fore,
while unknown events (i.e., the future) are described as being
behind the self [43]. In this way, culture (i.e., language) can play a
significant role in shaping the mental integration of spatial and
temporal information. Establishing which of these ostensibly
contradictory hypotheses (i.e., sensory-motor vs. sociocultural
experience) is most potent may be possible by investigating the
developmental characteristics of space-time mappings [44], or by
examining whether contrasting patterns in language (e.g., Aymara
vs. English) are also revealed in strictly non-linguistic domains
(e.g., movement dynamics).
One persistent challenge for researchers exploring the contents
of mind wandering lies in the manner in which people’s mental
contents are probed [30]. Here we chose to evaluate task-
unrelated thoughts retrospectively in order to avoid difficulties
associated with the repeated presentation of on-line thought
probes (e.g., meta-awareness of mind wandering may modulate
the contents of such activity). It should be noted, however, that off-
line responding can also be problematic, particularly with respect
to the reconstruction of prior thoughts [45]. Reassuringly, research
that has directly compared these two approaches (i.e., off-line vs.
on-line experience sampling) indicates a strong consistency in the
results obtained regardless of the method employed [46–48]. This
therefore suggests that the current results accurately reflect the
temporal destination of MTT. Corroboration of these findings
using direct experience sampling techniques will further inform
how movement impacts retrospection and prospection.
Consideration of the generalizability of the current findings
raises additional points of interest. It is reasonable to question
whether the effects of vection on the direction of MTT would
transfer to actual physical movement. As an illusion of self-motion,
vection, while compelling, lacks the richness of information (e.g.,
proprioceptive, haptic or auditory information) that regularly
accompanies movement. Thus, as a relatively impoverished sense
of motion, vection may be considered a somewhat conservative
test of the hypothesized relationship between the direction of
movement and the temporal locus of MTT. In this sense, it is
possible that the current effects would be amplified if participants
were required to physically move. Indeed, as noted previously, in
naturalistic settings people tend to move forward through their
environment. What this therefore suggests is that spontaneous
MTT may be focused primarily on future events [9,11], a
prediction that finds support in the existing literature on
daydreaming [49,50]. Establishing exactly how and why space-
time mapping impacts social-cognitive functioning remains an
important task for future research.
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